[paradox]

What's called natural law is really super natural law, Romans 2:15. I'd refer you to Cornelius Van Til on that one

Not even going there with presuppositionalism. It's redundant at best.

[willflop]

Well, you don't have to bring the entire methodology into it. The classical approach reasons in the other direction, but it still connects moral values with a necessary religious grounding.

[paradox]

It actually doesn't do that.

[willflop]

It actually doesn't do that.

Something that resembles a moral argument for God’s existence, or at least an argument from value, can be found in the fourth of Thomas Aquinas’s “Five Ways” (Aquinas 1265–1274, I, 1, 3). Aquinas there begins with the claim that among beings who possess such qualities as “good, true, and noble” there are gradations. Presumably he means that some things that are good are better than other good things; perhaps some noble people are nobler than others who are noble. In effect Aquinas is claiming that when we “grade” things in this way we are, at least implicitly, comparing them to some absolute standard. Aquinas believes this standard cannot be merely “ideal” or “hypothetical,” and thus this gradation is only possible if there is some being which has this quality to a “maximum” extent: “so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. Ii.” Aquinas goes on to affirm that this being which provides the standard is also the cause or explanation of the existence of these qualities, and such a cause must be God.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... gForGodExi

[stokesjokes]

@stokesjokes I stated I was going to make the point using a Non Christian point of View. Innocence is certainly not exclusive to Christianity. It’s certainly not exclusive to just those who practice Religion. The sense of “Right and Wrong” also are not Christian Exclusives. I know many a charitable upright and honest Atheist.

I don’t mean to imply that atheists don’t have that sense, I mean that if you’re a Christian, you believe that sense is because God placed it within us. My whole thesis is that as a Christian, you can’t separate that part of you from anything else. It has to inform everything else, it’s your entire worldview.

[paradox]

It actually doesn't do that.

Something that resembles a moral argument for God’s existence, or at least an argument from value, can be found in the fourth of Thomas Aquinas’s “Five Ways” (Aquinas 1265–1274, I, 1, 3). Aquinas there begins with the claim that among beings who possess such qualities as “good, true, and noble” there are gradations. Presumably he means that some things that are good are better than other good things; perhaps some noble people are nobler than others who are noble. In effect Aquinas is claiming that when we “grade” things in this way we are, at least implicitly, comparing them to some absolute standard. Aquinas believes this standard cannot be merely “ideal” or “hypothetical,” and thus this gradation is only possible if there is some being which has this quality to a “maximum” extent: “so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. Ii.” Aquinas goes on to affirm that this being which provides the standard is also the cause or explanation of the existence of these qualities, and such a cause must be God.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... gForGodExi

You are spinning your wheels. For a really good modern summation of this position, read Book One of Mere Christianity. There's really no sound argument against it. It stands the test of time.

[willflop]

It actually doesn't do that.

Something that resembles a moral argument for God’s existence, or at least an argument from value, can be found in the fourth of Thomas Aquinas’s “Five Ways” (Aquinas 1265–1274, I, 1, 3). Aquinas there begins with the claim that among beings who possess such qualities as “good, true, and noble” there are gradations. Presumably he means that some things that are good are better than other good things; perhaps some noble people are nobler than others who are noble. In effect Aquinas is claiming that when we “grade” things in this way we are, at least implicitly, comparing them to some absolute standard. Aquinas believes this standard cannot be merely “ideal” or “hypothetical,” and thus this gradation is only possible if there is some being which has this quality to a “maximum” extent: “so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. Ii.” Aquinas goes on to affirm that this being which provides the standard is also the cause or explanation of the existence of these qualities, and such a cause must be God.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... gForGodExi

You are spinning your wheels. For a really good modern summation of this position, read Book One of Mere Christianity. There's really no sound argument against it. It stands the test of time.

Honestly, are you trolling me here?

[paradox]

Seriously...you came after me. Blame yourself for not being able to make sense of whatever it is that you beleive.

[willflop]

Seriously...you came after me. Blame yourself for not being able to make sense of whatever it is that you beleive.

I said the classical approach reasons from moral values back to a grounding in God. You said it doesn't. I provided a quote that shows how Aquinas does this. You then counter me by referring to CS Lewis that makes the same argument as Aquinas, although differently formulated.

[paradox]

"it still connects moral values with a necessary religious grounding."

Clarify.

[willflop]

"it still connects moral values with a necessary religious grounding."

Clarify.

"It" here refers to the classical approach (approach talking about apologetical methodology, which in the previous post you brought up pressuppositionalism). Aquinas is a (or the) prime example of the classical arguments. A modern example is someone like William Lane Craig, who operates from the same principle brought up in the quote about Aquinas. This is how he structures his argument:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.

2. Objective moral values do exist.

3. Therefore, God exists.

To me, that's an argument that connects moral values to a necessary religious grounding. Aquinas made the same type of connection with religious values back to God, just like he did with his causal argument back to God. So did Lewis.

Edit -- I'll bow out on this discussion point now, as this has really taken a 180 for a thread about the election .

[paradox]

I get what you're saying, but that's completely different from the notion that morality neccesitates religion. In fact, it's a completely different topic altogether.

[willflop]

Taking it back to the original topic of abortion, I agree that it doesn’t necessitate that someone practice a certain religion, or profess belief in God, for them to hold to the view that abortion is wrong. The argument would be that they are inconsistent, their worldview doesn’t match what they really believe in their hearts.

But to the classical argument, I think it is relevant. Presumably, the self-evident belief that abortion is wrong is a belief that it’s objectively true that it’s wrong. If you agree that the existence of objective moral values necessitates the existence of God (Aquinas, Craig, etc.), then this belief carries with it unintended religious baggage. You can’t make objective claims that are not religious at the same time. Once I say all men are mortal, I’m committed to the belief that Socrates is mortal, whether I suppress that truth in unrighteousness or not.

[paradox]

It's universally accepted that you are committing a crime against both woman and child, if you harm her unborn child. The idea that a woman is justified to harm her unborn child, if she chooses to do so, comes from ideology.

In addition, children, in general, are shocked by the idea, until they are exposed to ideology.

[willflop]

So is your point that abortion is wrong because it is universally accepted as being wrong, when not corrupted by ideology, because we are naturally endowed to form true beliefs about morality, no religion needed?

Plantinga might ask, why should we trust our cognitive faculties that form our universally accepted moral beliefs? Tell me more of the story as to why it is more likely that they result in true beliefs, based on how they were formed through naturalist evolution, rather than false ones.

[paradox]

I think it speaks for itself. People instinctively understand that it's wrong, until they are otherwise persuaded. In this particular case, it just so happens to be a particular ideology that stresses the rights of the woman over the rights of the unborn.





.

[willflop]

But why should we trust our instincts?

[paradox]

.btw...the Planting insertion doesn't apply. He's not telling anyone to mistrust their senses. He's questioning the materialist as to why he trusts his senses when evolution doesn't even claim true beliefs. It claims survival. Let's not get off topic again.

[stokesjokes]

Right, so if you’re claiming that abortion is universally understood as wrong, and you’re saying this universal morality is not grounded in a deity, you’re implying that it’s the consequence of the material universe, so Plantinga’s argument would apply.

[willflop]

.btw...the Planting insertion doesn't apply. He's not telling anyone to mistrust their senses. He's questioning the materialist as to why he trusts his senses when evolution doesn't even claim true beliefs. It claims survival. Let's not get off topic again.

That's the point though. Since you reject that morality is grounded in religious beliefs, you are left arguing from a naturalistic foundation. Once you do that, you inherit the same set of epistemological problems that Plantinga points out. If I'm wrong, then provide a non religious answer as to why we should trust our moral intuitions.

[willflop]

Stokes beat me to it

[paradox]

Right, so if you’re claiming that abortion is universally understood as wrong, and you’re saying this universal morality is not grounded in a deity, you’re implying that it’s the consequence of the material universe, so Plantinga’s argument would apply.

Never said that morality doesn't come from God. We were discussing whether a person can understand that abortion is wrong without religion. It's really not that complicated.

[willflop]

You've only explained how someone can come to believe that abortion is wrong. The word understand, which I'm glad you used, is what's lacking in clarity. To understand implies you know why.

[paradox]

Again, it's really not that complicated.

[stokesjokes]

To think all this started because I suggested Christians’ political views about abortion are influenced by their religion. Some of y’all just want to be contrarian.