[jbock13]

WICHITA, Kan. (AP/The Blaze) — The grandmother of a 4-year-old girl who became hysterical during a security screening at a Kansas airport says security agents forced her to undergo a pat-down, and even yelled at the child and called her an uncooperative suspect.

The incident has been attracting increasing media and online attention since the child’s mother, Michelle Brademeyer of Montana, detailed the ordeal in a public Facebook post last week. The Transportation Security Administration says its agents followed proper screening procedures.

The child’s grandmother, Lori Croft, told The Associated Press on Wednesday that mother and daughter initially passed through security at Wichita’s airport without incident. But then the child ran to briefly hug Croft, who was awaiting a pat-down after tripping the alarm.

That’s when TSA agents insisted the child undergo a physical pat-down.

According to Brademeyer, a TSO “began yelling” at Izzy and ordered her to wait for a pat-down. She was prevented from approaching her mother, and told to “come to them, alone, and spread her arms and legs.” Frightened, Izzy screamed “I don’t want to” and bolted. She was returned to the security area, but not before a TSO threatened to shut down the airport and cancel all flights if Izzy was not restrained.[...]

http://www.theblaze.com/stories/tsa-pat ... -doing-it/

[NotAJerry]

Yay fear-mongering and extra bureaucracy. Is there the slightest hint of evidence that anything positive has come from TSA, much less outweighed the wealth of unconstitutional negatives?

[Purple Haize]

Ty Rand Paul for starting the process of dismantling the TSA! Biggest waste of money and joke of 'security' ever!

[From the class of 09]

The TSA is pretty classic in their screw-ups. Here is the best article I've read on them from the former head of the TSA.

Why Airport Security Is Broken—And How To Fix It
By KIP HAWLEY

Airport security in America is broken. I should know. For 3½ years—from my confirmation in July 2005 to President Barack Obama's inauguration in January 2009—I served as the head of the Transportation Security Administration.

You know the TSA. We're the ones who make you take off your shoes before padding through a metal detector in your socks (hopefully without holes in them). We're the ones who make you throw out your water bottles. We're the ones who end up on the evening news when someone's grandma gets patted down or a child's toy gets confiscated as a security risk. If you're a frequent traveler, you probably hate us.

More than a decade after 9/11, it is a national embarrassment that our airport security system remains so hopelessly bureaucratic and disconnected from the people whom it is meant to protect. Preventing terrorist attacks on air travel demands flexibility and the constant reassessment of threats. It also demands strong public support, which the current system has plainly failed to achieve.

The crux of the problem, as I learned in my years at the helm, is our wrongheaded approach to risk. In attempting to eliminate all risk from flying, we have made air travel an unending nightmare for U.S. passengers and visitors from overseas, while at the same time creating a security system that is brittle where it needs to be supple.

Any effort to rebuild TSA and get airport security right in the U.S. has to start with two basic principles:

First, the TSA's mission is to prevent a catastrophic attack on the transportation system, not to ensure that every single passenger can avoid harm while traveling. Much of the friction in the system today results from rules that are direct responses to how we were attacked on 9/11. But it's simply no longer the case that killing a few people on board a plane could lead to a hijacking. Never again will a terrorist be able to breach the cockpit simply with a box cutter or a knife. The cockpit doors have been reinforced, and passengers, flight crews and air marshals would intervene.

Second, the TSA's job is to manage risk, not to enforce regulations. Terrorists are adaptive, and we need to be adaptive, too. Regulations are always playing catch-up, because terrorists design their plots around the loopholes.

I tried to follow these principles as the head of the TSA, and I believe that the agency made strides during my tenure. But I readily acknowledge my share of failures as well. I arrived in 2005 with naive notions of wrangling the organization into shape, only to discover the power of the TSA's bureaucratic momentum and political pressures.

There is a way out of this mess—below, I'll set out five specific ideas for reform—but it helps to understand how we got here in the first place.

The airport checkpoint as we know it today sprang into existence in spring 2002, over a month and a half at Baltimore/Washington International airport. New demands on the system after 9/11, like an exhaustive manual check of all carry-on bags, had left checkpoints overwhelmed by long lines and backlogs. A team of management consultants from Accenture delved into the minutiae of checkpoint activity at BWI: How long did it take to pass from one point to another? How did the behavior of travelers affect line speed? How were people interacting with the equipment?

The consultants had a million ideas for improvement, but with no infrastructure, acquiring even the most ordinary items became a quest. For example, before passengers walked through the metal detectors, they needed to place their keys, jewelry and change into a container. But the long, skinny plastic dishes in use at the time tipped over. So a team member went to PetSmart, bought a bunch of different dog bowls and tested each one. The result was the white bowl with a rubber bottom that's still in use at many airports. (Please, no jokes about the TSA treating passengers like dogs.)

One brilliant bit of streamlining from the consultants: It turned out that if the outline of two footprints was drawn on a mat in the area for using metal-detecting wands, most people stepped on the feet with no prompting and spread their legs in the most efficient stance. Every second counts when you're processing thousands of passengers a day.

Members of Congress, who often fly home to their districts for the weekend, had begun demanding wait times of no longer than 10 minutes. But security is always about trade-offs: A two-minute standard would delight passengers but cost billions more in staffing; ignoring wait times would choke the system.

After I was confirmed as TSA administrator in 2005, one of the first things I did in office was to attend screener training at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport.

I sat down at a computer with Gary, a solidly built guy in his 40s with a mustache and a shaved head. Gary pointed at a screen that simulated the carry-on bag monitors at checkpoints. "What do you see?" he asked, a half smile on his face.

I stared at the series of colorful, ghostly images that Gary froze on the screen and tried to pick an easy one. "Well, that's a computer or some electronic, there are wires, maybe a battery." The sharp edges were easy to pick out, and the recognizable pattern of a motherboard jumped out. "But I don't know about that big orange blob on top of it."

"Right," said Gary. "The orange-colored part…. That means it's organic. Anything made of organic material—clothes, shoes, food—it's all going to register orange here."

As a confidence boost, Gary gave me a series of images with guns and knives in various positions. Knives lying flat were giveaways, but when viewed lengthwise, they had very little visible surface. Explosives were a whole different story. A plastic explosive like C4 is organic and dense. It appears as a heavy orange mass. Unfortunately, a block of cheddar cheese looks roughly the same.

As we started testing with a moving scanner, Gary warned me that too many false positives would be a big problem. A "hair-trigger" strategy would get me flunked. Images with guns took about one second to identify. Clear bags took roughly five seconds to double check for blade edges. It was cluttered bags—with their multihued oranges, blues, greens and grays jumbled together—that were the killers.

I wish that more of our passengers could see the system from the perspective of a screener. It is here, at the front lines, where the conundrum of airport security is in sharpest relief: the fear of missing even the smallest thing, versus the likelihood that you'll miss the big picture when you're focused on the small stuff.

Clearly, things needed to change. By the time of my arrival, the agency was focused almost entirely on finding prohibited items. Constant positive reinforcement on finding items like lighters had turned our checkpoint operations into an Easter-egg hunt. When we ran a test, putting dummy bomb components near lighters in bags at checkpoints, officers caught the lighters, not the bomb parts.

I wanted to reduce the amount of time that officers spent searching for low-risk objects, but politics intervened at every turn. Lighters were untouchable, having been banned by an act of Congress. And despite the radically reduced risk that knives and box cutters presented in the post-9/11 world, allowing them back on board was considered too emotionally charged for the American public.

We did succeed in getting some items (small scissors, ice skates) off the list of prohibited items. And we had explosives experts retrain the entire work force in terrorist tradecraft and bomb-making. Most important, Charlie Allen, the chief of intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security, tied the TSA into the wider world of U.S. intelligence, arranging for our leadership to participate in the daily counterterrorism video conference chaired from the White House. With a constant stream of live threat reporting to start each day, I was done with playing defense.

But the frustrations outweighed the progress. I had hoped to advance the idea of a Registered Traveler program, but the second that you create a population of travelers who are considered "trusted," that category of fliers moves to the top of al Qaeda's training list, whether they are old, young, white, Asian, military, civilian, male or female. The men who bombed the London Underground in July 2005 would all have been eligible for the Registered Traveler cards we were developing at the time. No realistic amount of prescreening can alleviate this threat when al Qaeda is working to recruit "clean" agents. TSA dropped the idea on my watch—though new versions of it continue to pop up.

Taking your shoes off for security is probably your least favorite part of flying these days. Mine, too. I came into office dead set on allowing people to keep their shoes on during screening. But, contrary to popular belief, it isn't just Richard Reid's failed shoe-bomb attempt in December 2001 that is responsible for the shoe rule. For years, the TSA has received intelligence on the terrorists' footwear-related innovations. Some very capable engineer on the other side is spending a lot of time improving shoe bombs, which can now be completely nonmetallic and concealed in a normal street shoe. There's still no quick way to detect them without an X-ray.

I was initially against a ban on liquids as well, because I thought that, with proper briefing, TSA officers could stop al Qaeda's new liquid bombs. Unfortunately, al Qaeda's advancing skill with hydrogen-peroxide-based bombs made a total liquid ban necessary for a brief period and a restriction on the amount of liquid one could carry on a plane necessary thereafter.

Existing scanners could allow passengers to carry on any amount of liquid they want, so long as they put it in the gray bins. The scanners have yet to be used in this way because of concern for the large number of false alarms and delays that they could cause. When I left TSA in 2009, the plan was to designate "liquid lanes" where waits might be longer but passengers could board with snow globes, beauty products or booze. That plan is still sitting on someone's desk.

The hijackings of the 1960s gave us magnetometers, to keep guns off planes. After the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, a small amount of international checked baggage was scanned and people were required to fly with their luggage. After 9/11, the TSA was created and blades were banned.

Looking at the airport security system that we have today, each measure has a reason—and each one provides some security value. But taken together they tell the story of an agency that, while effective at stopping anticipated threats, is too reactive and always finds itself fighting the last war.

Airport security has to change. The relationship between the public and the TSA has become too poisonous to be sustained. And the way that we use TSA officers—as little more than human versions of our scanners—is a tremendous waste of well-trained, engaged brains that could be evaluating risk rather than looking for violations of the Standard Operating Procedure.

What would a better system look like? If politicians gave the TSA some political cover, the agency could institute the following changes before the start of the summer travel season:

1. No more banned items: Aside from obvious weapons capable of fast, multiple killings—such as guns, toxins and explosive devices—it is time to end the TSA's use of well-trained security officers as kindergarten teachers to millions of passengers a day. The list of banned items has created an "Easter-egg hunt" mentality at the TSA. Worse, banning certain items gives terrorists a complete list of what not to use in their next attack. Lighters are banned? The next attack will use an electric trigger.

2. Allow all liquids: Simple checkpoint signage, a small software update and some traffic management are all that stand between you and bringing all your liquids on every U.S. flight. Really.

3. Give TSA officers more flexibility and rewards for initiative, and hold them accountable: No security agency on earth has the experience and pattern-recognition skills of TSA officers. We need to leverage that ability. TSA officers should have more discretion to interact with passengers and to work in looser teams throughout airports. And TSA's leaders must be prepared to support initiative even when officers make mistakes. Currently, independence on the ground is more likely to lead to discipline than reward.

4. Eliminate baggage fees: Much of the pain at TSA checkpoints these days can be attributed to passengers overstuffing their carry-on luggage to avoid baggage fees. The airlines had their reasons for implementing these fees, but the result has been a checkpoint nightmare. Airlines might increase ticket prices slightly to compensate for the lost revenue, but the main impact would be that checkpoint screening for everybody will be faster and safer.

5. Randomize security: Predictability is deadly. Banned-item lists, rigid protocols—if terrorists know what to expect at the airport, they have a greater chance of evading our system.

In Richmond, Va., we tested a system that randomized the security procedures encountered by passengers (additional upper-torso pat-downs, a thorough bag search, a swab test of carry-ons, etc.), while not subjecting everyone to the full gamut. At other airports, we tried out a system called "Playbook," which gave airports a virtual encyclopedia of possible security actions and let local law-enforcement, airport and TSA officials choose a customized set of counterterror measures.

Implemented nationally, this approach would give to the system as a whole a value greater than the sum of its parts—making it much harder for terrorists to learn how to evade our security protocols.

To be effective, airport security needs to embrace flexibility and risk management—principles that it is difficult for both the bureaucracy and the public to accept. The public wants the airport experience to be predictable, hassle-free and airtight and for it to keep us 100% safe. But 100% safety is unattainable. Embracing a bit of risk could reduce the hassle of today's airport experience while making us safer at the same time.

Over the past 10 years, most Americans have had extensive personal experience with the TSA, and this familiarity has bred contempt. People often suggest that the U.S. should adopt the "Israeli method" of airport security—which relies on less screening of banned items and more interviewing of passengers. But Israeli citizens accept the continued existence of a common enemy that requires them to tolerate necessary inconveniences, and they know that terror plots are ongoing.

In America, any successful attack—no matter how small—is likely to lead to a series of public recriminations and witch hunts. But security is a series of trade-offs. We've made it through the 10 years after 9/11 without another attack, something that was not a given. But no security system can be maintained over the long term without public support and cooperation. If Americans are ready to embrace risk, it is time to strike a new balance.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... 60546.html

[jbock13]

Or, abolish the TSA, and let the airlines hand security, the ones who really benefit from it.

Typical WSJ article. Instead of cutting government, just make it more 'efficient'. Sad thing that's happened to that once great paper.

[From the class of 09]

Or, abolish the TSA, and let the airlines hand security, the ones who really benefit from it.

Typical WSJ article. Instead of cutting government, just make it more 'efficient'. Sad thing that's happened to that once great paper.

I thought the passengers not being on a high jacked plane were the ones to benefit. I forgot it was the about the corporation.

[jbock13]

Or, abolish the TSA, and let the airlines hand security, the ones who really benefit from it.

Typical WSJ article. Instead of cutting government, just make it more 'efficient'. Sad thing that's happened to that once great paper.

I thought the passengers not being on a high jacked plane were the ones to benefit. I forgot it was the about the corporation.

So passengers can screen each other?

If you had airlines in charge, they could set their own standards.

[thepostman]

I don't have an issue with airline security but I think that TSA has taken it a little far. Check bags and have medal detectors...its not that hard of a concept. I realize 9/11 was an awful thing but it doesn't justify all the ridiculous crap that has come after it.

Having the airlines run it seems like an even worse idea....

Funny story. I was in Indonesia visiting my in-laws you were missionaries there. I had never been there and we were at some "airport" on some island somewhere and there was this guy with a machete. HE went through the medal detectors and they didn't even go off and he brought the thing on the plane. I knew I wasn't in America anymore, haha. It was pretty amazing.

[skywalker5291]

Oh TSA how utterly useless you are. Im sure you can guess my feelings about this little govt program by just looking at my pic.

[Purple Haize]

I had to deal with TSA this weekend again. USUALLY it is bearable but this time was annoying. There were 50 people in line. Yes, I counted. There were 15 TSA agents on the other side, that I could see. There were 4 available lanes but they only had 1 opened. At one point a TSA guy came up to the ID Checker and asked if he wanted them to open up another line. The guy said NO! To add insult to injury, I had to go through the Star Trek Scanner, and, whereas last time they just patted my bald spot, this time they patted my shoulder. That is it. Just came up, patted my shoulder and told me to move on. Really? After I had gone through the line had DOUBLED and still Mr ID Checker/Supervisor didn't want to open up any more lanes and, his words "Cause a bunch of confusion"

[From the class of 09]

Or, abolish the TSA, and let the airlines hand security, the ones who really benefit from it.

Typical WSJ article. Instead of cutting government, just make it more 'efficient'. Sad thing that's happened to that once great paper.

I thought the passengers not being on a high jacked plane were the ones to benefit. I forgot it was the about the corporation.

So passengers can screen each other?

If you had airlines in charge, they could set their own standards.

Or the government could continue to do it and improve their process.
I’m hardly a big government guy but I do think it has its place and airline security would be one of them. I don't want an airline cutting back on security just because they didn't make last quarter’s numbers. Sure the market will punish them when some terrorist gets through the airlines scaled back security and highjacks a plane. The company might even go bankrupt but that doesn’t do the passenger on the plane that was high jacked any good.

I know you’ve started to hang out with Uncle Ron a little more jbock but you’re slipping pretty quickly

[BJWilliams]

Purple, If I was his boss the only confusion he'd be causing is over who would take his place because he'd be canned

[From the class of 09]

Purple, If I was his boss the only confusion he'd be causing is over who would take his place because he'd be canned

If you were his boss...

No, too easy right?

[RubberMallet]

yeah allowing the airlines to regulate security itself would be the other end of the spectrum and just as laughable. the industry is run similar to how the gvt is run. spend spend spend.

about 50% of my time in the air is done commercially. its generally an absolute nightmare getting through security. the people that work for the TSA seem generally uneducated and unable to make basic judgement calls.

[jbock13]

I don't want an airline cutting back on security just because they didn't make last quarter’s numbers.

Why would they? Wouldn't they have the best incentive to ensure that they didn't have an attack?

Sure the market will punish them when some terrorist gets through the airlines scaled back security and highjacks a plane. The company might even go bankrupt but that doesn’t do the passenger on the plane that was high jacked any good.

True. So that airline should allow passengers to be able to handle hijackers, if necessary.

I know you’ve started to hang out with Uncle Ron a little more jbock but you’re slipping pretty quickly

lol, I've always been against the TSA. The biggest problem is the violation of the 4'th amendment. Every time you step through the scanner, you are assumed a security threat, until proven otherwise. Refuse to go through a scanner or a patdown, and you're still considered a security threat until proven otherwise. The 4'th Amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches. If you have no probable cause, you can't do it. But then again, Republicans and Democrats have joined together to form our post-constitutionalist society. Welcome to the brave new world.

[Purple Haize]

Take a look at San Francisco airport. They are the only airport given a TSA waiver and do an exceptional job. In fact, the TSA tries to run 'gotcha' games with them and have yet to succeed. Any airport is allowed to petition to opt out of TSA coverage, but that waiver must be granted by the government and the....wait for it...it.....TSA and FAA. No waivers have been granted.
I'm a fan of private companies running the screening. You would attract the best and the brightest and airline profits would increase because people would not see flying as the 21st Century Inquisition.,

[jbock13]

Take a look at San Francisco airport. They are the only airport given a TSA waiver and do an exceptional job. In fact, the TSA tries to run 'gotcha' games with them and have yet to succeed. Any airport is allowed to petition to opt out of TSA coverage, but that waiver must be granted by the government and the....wait for it...it.....TSA and FAA. No waivers have been granted.
I'm a fan of private companies running the screening. You would attract the best and the brightest and airline profits would increase because people would not see flying as the 21st Century Inquisition.,

If private companies ran it, I wouldn't have a problem. Bottom line, the TSA violates civil liberties.

[Purple Haize]

Bottom line. The TSA started out with good intentions but failed miserably. When you have 50% turn over and have to advertise job openings on pizza boxes you are an epic fail.

[BJWilliams]

I havent had a lot of issues personally when traveling but seeing some of the horror stories definitely made my blood boil and want to see TSA gotten rid of (or at least SEVERELY downsized)

[Purple Haize]

I havent had a lot of issues personally when traveling but seeing some of the horror stories definitely made my blood boil and want to see TSA gotten rid of (or at least SEVERELY downsized)

You can't really SEVERELY downsize the TSA but you can make it a lot more efficient. Efficiency and government are not words that go together.

[jbock13]

Bottom line. The TSA started out with good intentions but failed miserably. When you have 50% turn over and have to advertise job openings on pizza boxes you are an epic fail.

Isn't that always how big government creeps up? With good intentions... or so they say.

I'm not trying to sound like a conspiracy theorist, but once freedom is lost, it's rarely ever gained. Think about the DUI checkpoints. They're searching your car, but have no reason to even suspect you of DUI. But so many Americans are willing to simply give up their liberties... for the false allusion of safety.

Haize, I'm a little struck by your comment about government and efficiency. Isn't your candidate the one who's all about not cutting government, but making it more efficient? We all know that typical Republican code language for Rove's big government conservatism. We saw it right here in Virginia with McDonnell.

I know I sound like a super Paul bot tonight I actually haven't kept up with politics much lately. But I'll be back at it soon. And yes I'll still vote for Mittens over the socialist. I get frustrated when people know that Obama is bad for the nation, but won't vote for the alternative. But deep inside, I share that frustration. I just operate by my own rule, I vote Libertarian in every election in which there is no Democrat running.

[Purple Haize]

You have to catch the train before you can slow the train before you can turn around the train. If he adopts principles of the Ryan plan or any other conservative plan out there it will go a long way. If he can limit the increase in growth THAT would be a huge win.

[jbock13]

You have to catch the train before you can slow the train before you can turn around the train. If he adopts principles of the Ryan plan or any other conservative plan out there it will go a long way. If he can limit the increase in growth THAT would be a huge win.

But will he? Ryan's plan is a start, but it takes almost 60 years to actually balance the budget. I keep hearing how Romney (mainly from Fox News) will be more conservative than we think. But in the back of my mind, I remember the "etch-a-sketch" comments his chief advisor made. Being in Massachusetts is no excuse for forsaking your principles, unless he never had them to begin with.

[Purple Haize]

You have to catch the train before you can slow the train before you can turn around the train. If he adopts principles of the Ryan plan or any other conservative plan out there it will go a long way. If he can limit the increase in growth THAT would be a huge win.

But will he? Ryan's plan is a start, but it takes almost 60 years to actually balance the budget. I keep hearing how Romney (mainly from Fox News) will be more conservative than we think. But in the back of my mind, I remember the "etch-a-sketch" comments his chief advisor made. Being in Massachusetts is no excuse for forsaking your principles, unless he never had them to begin with.

See. That would be the 'Catching the Train' phase. The etch a sketch comment was totally blown out of proportion. I took it to mean that those who opposed him in the Primary would support him in the General. Same with donors and which policies were focused upon.

[ATrain]

Efficiency and government are not words that go together.

QFT.